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1 Introduction
Much of philosophy of language and linguistics is concerned with showing
what is special about language. One of Grice’s (1967/1989) contributions, against
this tendency, was to treat speech as a form of rational activity, subject to the
same sorts of norms and expectations that apply to all such activity. This gen-
eral perspective has proved very fruitful in pragmatics. However, it is rarely
explicitly asked whether a particular pragmatic phenomenon should be under-
stood entirely in terms of rational agency or whether positing special linguistic
principles is necessary. This paper is concerned with evaluating the degree to
which a species of simple pragmatic inferences, scalar implicatures, should be
viewed as a form of rational inference. A rigorous answer to this last ques-
tion requires using the theoretical resources of game theory. I show that weak-
dominance reasoning, a standard form of game-theoretic reasoning, allows us to
cash out the derivation of simple scalar implicatures as a form of rational infer-
ence. I argue that this account of the scalar implicatures is more principled and
robust than other explanations in the game theory and pragmatics literature.
However, we can still see that deriving Gricean implicatures on the basis of
decision and game-theoretic tools is not nearly as straightforward as we might
hope, and the ultimate tools needed are disquietingly powerful.
∗This paper is a distant descendent of my first, tenative foray into these issues, “Grice, Ratio-
nality, and Utterance Choice”. I would like to thank Dirk Bergemann, Richard Breheny, Emmanuel
Chemla, Vince Crawford, Michael Franke, Harvey Friedman,Michael Rothschild, Robert van Rooij
and Joel Sobel for very useful discussion of these topics. I am also grateful to the hardy participants
of a seminar in Oxford.
1
2 Deriving scalar implicatures
Consider this paradigmatic example of a scalar implicature:
Some/All Case There was a small cake in the refrigerator the night before.
Mary says to Kay, the next morning, “I ate some of the cake last night.”
There is an obvious suggestion that Mary conveys the information that
she ate some but not all of the cake last night.
For the example to work, we need to make certain background assumptions,
but when these are in place (and it is not hard to imagine them in place) then
Mary’s words will carry the meaning suggested. Despite the seeming triviality
of this phenomenon, scalar implicatures play a lively role in current contem-
porary linguistics, both formal and experimental (e.g. Horn, 1972; Chierchia,
2004; Noveck, 2001), .
It might seem that the kind of reasoning in the Some/All Case and others
like it is simply rational inference. Let us try to tease out this thought: We
can think of communicative situations of this kind as ones in which there is
asymmetric information: Mary knows something Kay does not, namely how
much cake she (Mary) ate. Mary wants Kay to know what she knows. Now
suppose Mary, wanting to speak only once, has to choose between uttering the
following two sentences:
(1) a. I ate some of the cake.
b. I ate all of the cake.
Let us assume, as is standard, that (1-b) strictly entails (1-a): if someone ate
all the cake, then ipso facto they ate some of the cake. Consider the choice of
utterance from Mary’s perspective: If Mary ate all of the cake then she should
assert (1-b) rather than (1-a) as that would convey more information to Kay,
given the entailment relations. On the other hand, if she ate only some of the
cake then (1-b) would give Kay false information which is undesirable. So, if
Mary is reasonable she will utter (1-a) if she ate just some of the cake, and (1-b)
if she ate all of the cake. Now think of this from Kay’s perspective: she can
also reason, as we did, about Mary’s behavior, so she can conclude that Mary
will only utter (1-a) if and only if she only ate some of the cake. So, when Mary
utters (1-a) Kay will be able to work out that that Mary only ate some of the
cake, and hence that (1-b) is false. This last inference, is the scalar implicature.
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The informal reasoning, plausible as it may sound, is flawed. To see this
note that in the reasoning above, when Mary considers what information she
is conveying to Kay she is not taking account of the fact that Kay may read
more into her utterance than just the literal message. If she does take this into
account, the entailment relation between (1-a) and (1-b) does not carry over to
an entailment relation between the information conveyed by each of the sen-
tences. In other words, Mary cannot assume that just because one sentence
has a stronger literal meaning than another that it will convey more informa-
tion. But if we cannot assume that, the informal reasoning above does not go
through.
To put the point another way: All that we can assume about Mary’s prefer-
ences is that she wants to convey as much (true) information as possible. We
cannot determine which of (1-a) or (1-b) will convey more information based
on their literal meaning alone since we need to assume that sentences may
convey more than their literal meaning. So, from the fact that Mary prefers
to convey as much information as possible and the fact that (1-b) is literally
weaker than (1-a), it does not follow that Mary will say (1-b) rather than (1-a).
Something more is needed.
What we have in a communicative situation like the Some/All Case is a de-
cision problem involving two rational agents. Such problems are known to be
complex, and there is a special branch of economics and decision theory, game
theory, devoted to analyzing them. Most of this paper is concerned with mak-
ing the case that game theory allows us view scalar implicatures, like the one
above, as a form of rational inference. There is already a substantial literature
on this question, but my approach and conclusions differ from the standard
ones in that literature, and I will try to mark these differences as I go along.
3 Plan
Here is the plan of this (lengthy) paper: The next section, §4, discusses Grice’s
maxims and the treatment of scalar implicatures in contemporary linguistics.
§5–§8 presents the game-theoretic background necessary for the rest of the pa-
per. In §5, I introduce the signaling gamewhich is the standard model for com-
municative situations in game theory. In §6, I discuss the Nash equilibrium no-
tion and the standard refinements of it used for thinking about games like the
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signaling game. §7 discusses what constraints, outside of standard equilibrium
notions, there are on how rational players should play games. §8 discusses
what we should hope for in a game-theoretic model of scalar implicatures.
§9 introduces a barebones game for modeling scalar implicatures and argues
that standard equilibrium concepts cannot be used to argue that scalar impli-
catures are a rational inference. In §10, I argue that iterative weak-dominance
reasoning can capture the derivation of scalar implicatures. §11 briefly con-
siders (and rejects) the proposal that Gricean reasoning should be captured by
means of the Pareto-Nash equilibrium. §12 discusses and criticizes what I call
reasoning-based accounts, popular models in the current literature for explain-
ing the derivation of scalar implicatures. In sections §13–§16, I discuss how to
apply weak-dominance arguments to different types of scalar and relevance
implicatures. §17 discusses disclosure cases from the economics literature and
assesses their connection to scalar implicatures.
There are twomain aims of this paper, one theoretical and one methodolog-
ical. The theoretical aim is to show that iterative weak dominance provides a
good way of explaining the derivation of scalar implicatures within a game-
theoretic framework. To some extent this vindicates the commonly held view
that scalar implicatures—in idealized cases—are a form of rational inference.
Mymethodological aim is less specific. There has been a significant amount
of work in game-theoretic pragmatics in the last decade or so.1 This work pro-
vides a variety of different techniques for deriving implicatures of many types.
As I argued in the introduction, this is an important project because simple
explanations of even the most basic implicatures in terms of rationality face
serious conceptual hurdles. We must stay aware, though, that game theory, as
a collection of different techniques for modeling situations, is a very powerful
tool. Merely providing some model in game theory that makes a set of behav-
ioral predictions is of little interest, since, for any precisely characterized and
vaguely reasonable behavior, we should antecedently expect to be able to pro-
vide some game-theoreticmodel. We need to evaluate game-theoretic models of
pragmatic reasoning along a variety of dimensions, asking questions like: How
robust is the model against slight changes in one’s description of the situation?
How standard is the sort of reasoning being attributed to the players? Can
1Parikh (1991, 2001) provides the first game-theoretic account of implicatures, including scalar
implicatures.
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these models extend to parallel non-linguistic cases? I argue here that many
of the prominent theories in the literature do not fare well in the face of this
scrutiny. I should note, however, that this paper is by no means intended as a
review of the current literature, and many important contributions go without
mention.2
4 Maxims and scalar implicatures
Grice (1967/1989) first systematically identified and analyzed conversational
phenomena along the line of the Some/All Case. Grice attempted to account
for these by positing a set of maxims governing conversation. One of these
maxims, Quantity, enjoins the speaker to “Make your contribution as informa-
tive as is required (for the current purposes of exchange).” Another maxim,
Quality, enjoins the speaker to tell the truth. Implicatures consist, essentially,
of inferences people can make about what the speaker must have meant to
convey given that he was following Grice’s maxims. So, in the Some/All case
when we assume that Mary obeys Quantity and Quality and that Kay knows
this, we seem to be able to get the right inference: Quantity enjoins Mary to say
she ate all of the cake if she did while Quality prevents her from doing so if she
doesn’t. So if Mary says she ate some of the cake, the speaker can reasonably
infer that she didn’t eat all of it. This inference is the implicature.
Grice wanted to ground these maxims in human rationality rather than to
merely put them forward as behavioral generalizations. He discusses the pos-
sibility that the maxims are valid because “it is just a well-recognized empirical
fact that people do behave in these ways” but suggests that he would prefer to
have them more solidly grounded in human rationality. Grice writes,
So I would like to be able to show that observance of the Cooper-
ative Principle and maxims is reasonable (rational) along the fol-
lowing lines: that anyone who cares about the goals that are cen-
tral to conversation/communication (such as giving and receiving
information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be
expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstance, in par-
ticipation in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the as-
2Most notably, as my interest is in reconstructing inferences speakers can make, I do not discuss
attempts to explain implicatures in terms of evolutionary game theory.
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sumption that they are conducted in general accordance with the
Cooperative Principle and the maxims.
Grice’s views here are more nuanced than this one quote might suggest, but I
think it is clear that Grice was interested in trying to ground either the max-
ims themselves (or the behavior they require) in human rationality and, more
specifically, in the commonality of interests in speaker and audience in certain
communicative situations.
Grice himself did not consider cases of exactly the form of the Some/All
Case—though he considered very similar ones in his discussion of disjunction.
Horn (1972) is widely regarded as the first person to give a systematic consid-
eration of scalar implicatures.3 Horn suggests that certain classes of linguistic
expressions can be arrayed on a scale of strength. Examples include some/all,
one/two/three. . . , and few/none. The critical feature of such paradigmatic scales
is that the scale is ordered by logical strength: the higher members of the scale
entail the lower members. So, I ate all the cake entails I ate some of the cake, I
ate three hotdogs entails I ate two hotdogs, I saw none of the students entails I saw
few students. This excludes, for instance, short and tall from being on a scale
together since I am tall does not entail I am short or vice versa (similarly with
few and all—though a few is on a scale with all).
Horn observed that the use of scalar terms systematically leads to the deriva-
tion of scalar implicatures parallel to that in the Some/All Case. This can be
explained by supposing that choice between scalar terms is governed by the
maxims of quantity and quality. Since Grice and Horn, the exact nature and
logic of these implicatures has been developed extensively (e.g., Gazdar, 1979;
Soames, 1982; Sauerland, 2004; Spector, 2006). Some linguists have recently ar-
gued that some aspects of the phenomenon are best captured by grammatical
devices for generating implicatures rather than simply making reference to the
Griceanmaxims (Chierchia, 2004; Chierchia et al., 2012; Fox, 2006). Others have
argued that the Gricean maxims, properly formalized, can capture most ob-
served scalar implicatures (Sauerland, 2004; Schulz and van Rooij, 2006; Spec-
tor, 2006).
What I want to highlight is that in this debate over the nature of scalar
implicatures, it is generally assumed by both parties that an explanation in
3There are also substantial non-Gricean—though Gricean-inspired—schools for explaining im-
plicature such as relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986).
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terms of the Gricean maxims would, all else equal, be more principled than
one that makes reference to other special linguistic rules. Those who argue for
special grammatical rules think the Gricean story is not capable of capturing all
the relevant linguistic data. I take it the default preference for the Gricean view
of implicatures gets some of its plausibility from the common belief that the
maxims are not special linguistics rules, but rather follow from basic rationality
assumptions. As I suggested earlier, game theory allows us to explore this
assumption directly.
5 Signaling games
In this section and the follow two, I will review the basic game theory necessary
for the paper. In most instances, I will try to be relatively informal in my pre-
sentation, though the details are easily found elsewhere and will be provided
here when relevant. Those already familiar with basic game theory, signaling
games, and standard equilibrium refinements, may skip these sections.
David Lewis’sConvention (1969) gave the basicmodel of the signaling game.
These games were introduced to the economics literature by Spence (1973) and
have been studied since (see Sobel, 2009, for a recent review) as an important
tool for modeling situations with asymmetric information.
The basic situation of a (two-person) signaling game can be described as
follows: there are two players, a speaker and a hearer. The speaker has private
information. We can describe this private information by saying there are dif-
ferent types the speakermight have and that the speaker’s type is assignedwith
some probability distribution by nature. Each type of speaker has available to
him the option to send a message in a set M . Each hearer, having seen the
message, chooses an an actions from a set A. For each triplet of type, message
and action we get a payoff U .4
Signaling games are extensive-form games, which is to say they are repre-
sented as a series of sequential moves by different players. Figure 1 gives
a standard representation of a simple signaling game. This chart can be ex-
plained as follows: N represents “nature” which is taken to decide the type of
4So we can represent a (finite) signaling game as a {T, p,M,A,U}where T is the set of types p
is a probability distribution over them, M is the set of message, A is a function from messages to
actions, and U is a function from triplets of types, messages and actions to pairs of payoffs from
the speaker and hearer.
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Figure 1: A signaling game
the sender S with probability p for type 1 and 1 − p for type 2. The speaker
of either type has two message available to him a or b. The dashed line rep-
resents the information state of the hearer: indicating that he cannot tell what
the speaker type is but only what signal the speaker used. L and R represent
the two moves available to the hearer in any given state. The fact that the two
speaker types are not connected by dashed lines means that the speaker knows
which type he is. The pair of numbers at the end of each final branch represent
the speaker and hearer payoff respectively. Note that we will discuss varia-
tions on this game where there are limitations on S or H ’s action based either
on the type (in the case of S) or the message received (in the case ofH).
The normal way of thinking about strategies in extensive-form games is as
fully specific dispositions to play the game in a particular way (no matter how
the other person plays). So, for example, in the game above we can identify the
following four pure (i.e. non-probabilistic) speaker strategies: 1a2a (S1 plays a
and S2 plays a), 1a2b (S1 plays a and S2 plays b), 1b2a, 1b2b. The pure hearer
strategies, on the other hand, are responses to the different signals: aLbL (H
plays L in response to a and L in response to B), aLbR, aRbL, aRbR. Note that
hearer strategies cannot depend on the type of speaker because the hearer does
not have that information available to him. Mixed strategies are ones in which
responses are chosen with a probability distribution rather than deterministi-
cally. We can also talk about the expected payoff for a pair of strategies in the
normal way.
A natural question is how extensive-form games, such as signaling games,
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relate to the standard representation of games by tables, such as the prisoner’s
dilemma game represented in figure 2. We call representations these tabular
C D
C 3, 3 1, 4
D 4, 1 2, 2
Figure 2: Prisoner’s Dilemma
representations, normal or strategic forms. Corresponding to each extensive-
form game is a normal-form game, inwhichwe think of each player as (at once)
choosing complete pure strategies. I will give an example of a normal-form
representation of an extensive-form game in the next section. For a signaling
game the normal form can be given as a mapping from all the possible combi-
nations of pure strategies to the expected payoff (given the probability distribu-
tion over states of nature).5 Note that the correspondence between extensive-
form games and normal-form games is not one-to-one: for any normal-form
game there are many extensive-form games compatible with it.
6 Nash equilibria and refinements
Game theory provides various solution concepts for assessing howplayers should
play games. The most standard solution concept is the Nash equilibrium. A
little notation: let Ui(s1, S2) be the expected payoff to player i of playing strat-
egy s1 against an opponent who plays strategy s2. A Nash equilibrium is a
pair of strategies for player 1 and player 2, (s1, s2), such that for all strategies
s′
1
possible for player 1, U1(s1, s2) ≥ U1(s
′
1
, s2) and for all strategies s
′
2
possible
for player 2, U2(s1, s2) ≥ U2(s1, s
′
2
). In other words, a Nash equilibrium is pair
of strategies that neither player has an incentive to deviate alone from. In the
prisoner’s dilemma the only Nash equilibrium is the one where both players
defect: there is an incentive for both players to deviate together but not for just
one to.
In extensive-form games with sequential moves, such as the signaling game
there are Nash equilibria that are not very plausible. To see, this consider the
simple multi-stage game in figure 3. In this game the first player chooses be-
5Alternatively, but less standardly, we can treat nature as another “player” also and have a
three-person game with its normal form.
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Figure 3: Extensive-form game
tween L and R, so he has two pure strategies (L and R), whereas the second
player has a different choice of move depending on what the first player has
done. Thus, there are four full, non-probabilistic strategies for him: choose a
in response to L, and c in response to R (which we’ll write LaRc), LaRd, LbRc
and LbRd. We can use this listing of strategies to give the normal-form rep-
resentation of the game in figure 4. The strategy pair in which player 1 plays
LaRc LaRd LbRc LbRd
L 2, 1 2, 1 1, 2 1, 2
R 0, 0 3, 1 0, 0 3, 1
Figure 4: Normal form of game in figure 3
strategy L and player 2 plays LbRc is a Nash equilibrium. Note, however, that
if this equilibrium is played, player 2 will never have a chance to play c in re-
sponse to R. However, the strategy pair being a Nash Equilibrium depends on
this disposition on his part, as otherwise player 1 would prefer to play R. It
seems that, in fact, were player 1 to play R, player 2, if he were rational (in the
sense of utility maximizing), would have to play d in response to maximize his
payoff. However, if player 1 knows that, and is himself rational, then he will
know that he can maximize his payoff by playing R. So while (L,LbRc) is a
Nash equilibrium, it is not one which we should expect rational agents to play.
There are a set of refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept designed to
deal with this inadequacy. Indeed, there are different refinements for games
with perfect information such as the one in figure 3 from those for games with
imperfect information such as signaling games. Since we will focus on games
of imperfect information, I will only present refinements that apply to them.6
6Thus I will not discuss subgame perfection, the most common refinement to deal with games
like that of figure 3.
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What we can do is ensure, relative to a pair of strategies, rationality of the
strategy at every point where a player might make a decision. The most stan-
dard equilibrium refinement for games of imperfect information that captures
this sequential rationality is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). As one
might guess from the name, a PBE is modeled on the idea that both players
are Bayesian-updaters trying to maximize expected utility. When a strategy is
a PBE it means, essentially, that it could be played by two players exhibiting
such Bayesian rationality who each believe the other is playing the equilibrium
strategy. Informally, a pair of strategies is a PBE if at every decision point, each
move at that point maximizes expected utility relative to the credence function
of the player, which itself is constrained by the belief that the other player is
playing the PBE andwhatever other information is available at that point given
the game structure. If the belief that the other player is playing the PBE is not
possible at a decision point, then the only condition put on the players move is
it maximize utility relative to some belief about how the other player is acting.
In the game in figure 3, the move Rc fails to maximize utility on any beliefs and
so is ruled out.
We can give the definition of a PBE for signaling games more explicitly.
There are two conditions for a pair of strategies, (sS , sH), to be a PBE: one
condition on the speaker strategy and one condition on the hearer strategy.
The speaker strategy must simply be such that for each type it maximizes ex-
pected utility on the assumption that the hearer plays sH . The hearer strategy
must meet a more complex condition. We assume the hearer starts (before the
game play) with a graded belief about the speaker’s type based on the proba-
bility distribution associated with N ’s move. We then assume that in response
to each message the hearer updates his belief about the speaker’s type in ac-
cordance with Bayes’ rule based on the assumption that the speaker is play-
ing sS if this is possible. If this is not possible, we simply assume he forms
some consistent belief about how the hearer will play. The condition on the
hearer’s response to a messagem is that there is a credence function satisfying
the conditions above on which the hearer’s response maximizes his expected
utility. Essentially this is two separate conditions: for so-called “on the path”
messages—messages that given sS and the game structure, the speaker has a
positive probability of receiving—Bayes’ rule determines hearers credences af-
ter receiving the message and the equilibrium condition is that the response
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is rational on for those credences. For so-called “off-the-path” messages—
messages the hearer would assigns probability 0 to given the game structure
and that the speaker is playing sS—the hearer’s response must be optimal for
some belief about the speaker’s type that is consistent with the hearer receiving
an off-the-path message. Refinements of the PBE typically take the form of a
restriction on beliefs in response to off-the-path messages.7
7 Rationality and dominance
The equilibrium notions discussed above are just that: pairs of strategies that
are self-reinforcing. Once you know you are in an equilibrium you don’t have
any incentive to get out of it. However, as many have noted, when we think of
games as one-off events without prior coordination these notions tell us little
about how players should or will play: for in these cases the players cannot
be assumed to have gotten into an equilibrium already. There are two related
problems: 1) Even if there is only one Nash (or perfect Bayesian) equilibrium
available in a game we have not explained why rational agents should play
it. 2) Even if we could argue that rational agents should only play strategies
that form part of some Nash equilibrium, most games provide more than one
equilibria so we still are left with the question of how players should choose
an equilibrium.8
In many cases, there simply is nothing to say about what rational agents
should do. As an example consider the simple coordination game in figure 5.
In this game, the players have a mutual interest in meeting at one of the two
pure Nash equilibria: the upper left (AC) and the lower right squares (BD). It
C D
A 1, 1 0, 0
B 0, 0 1, 1
Figure 5: Coordination game
should be obvious that there is no privileged rational way to play the game.
To summarize: Nash equilibria (and their refinements) are strategy pairs
that one player does not want to deviate from if he knows the other player will
7Cho and Kreps (1987) give a notable example of such a refinement.
8There is a large literature on equilibrium selection (most notably, Harsanyi and Selten, 1988),
but the considerations there do not obviously connect up with simple considerations of rationality.
play his part. The existence of a Nash equilibria does not mean a player should
play it: after all there can be multiple Nash equilibria. In certain cases, equi-
librium refinements may help eliminate some equilibria that are in some way
defective, but in symmetric situations like figure 5 it follows a priori that equi-
librium concepts will not dictate a unique way rational players should play.
There are, also, clear cases where we can say how rational agents should
play the game. To delineate these cases there is a tradition of using non-
equilibrium notions, such as dominance reasoning to capture theways inwhich
simple rationality might dictate play. Dominance relations, by definition, ob-
tain between strategies in a normal-form representation. A given strategy, s,
for player, i, strictly dominates another strategy, s′, if no matter what s guaran-
tees i a strictly higher payoff than s′. By no matter what, I mean no matter what
strategy the other player chooses and no matter what the state of nature is.
We can reasonably assume that rational agents will not play strictly dominated
strategies, based on the simple idea that rational agents want to maximize ex-
pected utility. The notion of strict dominance alone, in some cases, determine
how rational agents will play a game. For instance, in the prisoner’s dilemma,
since defection is a strictly dominant move for both players, we expect rational
agents to defect.9
Another form of dominance reasoning that will be particularly important
for us isweak dominance. A given strategy s for player iweakly dominates another
strategy s′ if s guarantees i at least as high a payoff as s′ and for some state of
affairs (i.e. some possible opponent strategy and/or state of nature) s gives i a
strictly higher payoff then s′. Consider, for instance, the game in figure 6. Here,
C D
A 1, 1 1, 0
B 1, 1 1, 1
Figure 6: Simple game
it might seem that a rational player 2 will choose C over D as that guarantees
him at least as high a payoff as D no matter what player 1 does and a higher
pay off in one case. Note that weakly dominated strategies, unlike strongly
9As a note, it is easy to show that if there is a strategy pair determined by strict domination
it is the unique Nash equilibrium. Also it’s worth noting that we can view survival of rounds of
dominance reasoning as an equilibrium refinement. However, I call these non-equilibrium notions
since they don’t depend on considering an equilibrium.
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dominates strategies can form part of a Nash equilibrium (as well as PBEs). In
the game in figure 6 there are three pure Nash equilibria: (A,C), (B,C), (B,D)
and the last of these includes the weakly dominated move D.
In both normal-form and extensive-form games we can also consider iter-
ative applications of dominance reasoning. The informal idea is this: player 1
and player 2 are both rational and both know they know this, and know they
know they know this, and so on. In other words, they have common knowl-
edge of rationality. In this case, it would seem, we can iteratively eliminate
dominated strategies: i.e. in player 1’s own strategic reasoning he can assume
that player 2 will not play any strictly dominated strategies, and evaluate dom-
inance on that assumption. A simple example is in figure 7. Note that no move
C D
A 1, 1 2, 2
B 2, 2 1, 3
Figure 7: Solvable by iterative dominance
is dominant for player 1 without any assumptions about player 2’s behavior.
However, for player 2, D strictly dominates C. If player 1 knows that player 2
will not play strictly dominated strategies, then, on this assumption, move A
strictly dominates B for player 1.
Iterative dominance reasoning, in general, works as follows: we eliminate
a strategy or move based on the fact that it is dominated by another move or
strategy. Then we update our understanding of the game to reflect this elimi-
nation by considering a new game in which the dominated strategy or move is
not allowed. We continue until there are no more dominated strategies in the
game we have left.
With respect to weak dominance such iterative reasoning can be problem-
atic. Iterative weak-dominance reasoning is possible, but in many cases the
result of such reasoning depends on the order in which it is done. Take, for,
example the case in figure 8. Here different orders of elimination of weakly
L R
A 2, 3 3, 3
B 1, 0 0, 1
C 0, 1 1, 0
Figure 8: Order of weak dominance elimination matters
14
dominated strategies result in either (A,L) or (A,R) being the strategy pair left
after elimination. What this shows is that merely demonstrating that some
strategy pair is be reached by a chain of iterated dominance reasoning cannot
be an argument in itself that rational players should play the strategies in the
pair. Despite this, there are some results that in a restricted class of games the
order of iterated weak dominance does not affect the outcome (at least in terms
of payout).10 In particular, in games with identical payoffs the order of itera-
tive elimination by weak dominance does not affect strategic reasoning. This
will be useful for us, as all the games we will consider have identical payoffs
for both players. Another way of ensuring that iterated weak-dominance rea-
soning results in a unique result is to ensure that at each stage of reasoning one
eliminates all strategies/moves that are weakly dominated. This special form
of iterative weak dominance is called iterative admissibility.
Given that the order of eliminating strategies matters, it cannot be a require-
ment on rationality that players do not play iteratively dominated strategies
(for this could eliminate all strategies, as in 8). However many authors, most
influentially Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), posit that rational players should
not play a strategy unless it survives some complete series of iterative elim-
ination of weakly-dominant strategies.11 However, this position is far from
universally held by game theorists.
Iterative-weak dominance reasoning is a much more powerful tool than
strict dominance reasoning for extensive-form games. Consider, for instance,
the extensive-form game in figure 3. Here there is not sufficient strict domi-
nation of any strategy over another to determine uniquely what we think of
as rational play. For instance, the strategy for second player of playing b if
the first player plays L and c if the first player plays R is not strictly domi-
nated. For this strategy will do just as well as playing b and d as long as the
first player plays L. Nonetheless LbRd weakly dominates LbRc since there it
always does as well, but sometimes does better. Thus, in this game, as in many
extensive-form games, weak-dominance reasoning is necessary to single out
rational lines of play. However, while in the game in figure 3 weak dominance
reasoning might seem attractive in other games, such as the centipede game
10The earliest such result (which is good enough for our purposes) is Rochet (1980) (see also
Marx and Swinkles, 1997).
11By ‘complete series’ I mean a series of eliminations at end of which no further elimination by
weak dominance is possible.
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Rosenthal (1981) weak-dominance reasoning gives very unintuitive results as
it validates backward induction. This and other consideration has led many to
think weak-dominance reasoning should not be taken to guide rational play.
As a note, in extensive-form games, we can speak of a move rather than a
strategy being weakly dominated, by which we will mean that every strategy
that includes that move is weakly dominated. For instance, in the game in
figure 3 player 2’s moves a and c are weakly dominated, since any strategy
that includes those moves will be weakly dominated.
What I have done here is present two related ways of reasoning about
games in absence of an equilibrium: iterative strict and weak dominance. Both
of these ways of reasoning about games apply to extensive-formgames through
their normal form.12 On the surface, both seem plausible as ways rational
agents should think about games: after all, why should one ever play a domi-
nated strategy?
However, spelling out a formal concept of rationality and common knowl-
edge of rationality that justifies these forms of reasoning (in both extensive
and normal-form games) is a non-trivial task. Since the eighties many game-
theorists have tried to spell out constraints on rational strategic reasoning that
capture inter alia these forms of dominance reasoning.13 I will not review this
extensive and complex literature on the epistemic foundations of game theory.14
However, it is worth noting that conceptions of common knowledge (or belief)
of rationality that require players to play only those strategies reached by iter-
ative elimination of strictly dominated strategies have long been known, while
conceptions of common knowledge of rationality the force iterative elimination
of weakly dominated strategies have, more recently, been explored (Branden-
burger, 2007; Brandenburger et al., 2008). For our purposes it will be enough
to say that iterative dominance reasoning (in both forms) is arguably a form of
rational inference in games where common knowledge of rationality obtains.
12Of course, strictly speaking reduction of games by strict andweak dominance are just algebraic
ways of reducing games, I call themmethods of reasoning as they closely connect to intuitive ways
of thinking of a chain of reasoning.
13The starting point is the notion of rationalizable strategies independently proposed by Pearce
(1984) and Bernheim (1984).
14See Battigalli and Bonanno (1999) and Brandenburger (2007) for introduction to program.
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8 Game-theoretic account of implicatures
The goal of this paper is to provide an analysis of the communicative situation
in which scalar implicatures occur that explains the derivation of the impli-
catures as a sort of rational inference. The hope would be that, at least for
idealized cases, we could view the speaker’s following of the Gricean maxims
as well as the hearer’s derivation of the scalar implicatures as simply ratio-
nally compelling behavior, given the set-up of the game. If we succeed, we
show why in idealized but still useful models rational agents should behave
as the Gricean maxims dictate. If we can show this then we need not view the
maxims as mere useful empirical generalizations but rather as generalizations
about what how rational agents should act—at least for idealized cases.
Any attempt at carrying out this project will include two elements (not al-
ways entirely separate): a model of the communicative situation (i.e. the game
itself) and an analysis of why rational agents should choose the Gricean reason-
ing. The plausibility of such a model will depend on both these components.
The model itself is meant to describe in a formally tractable way, the com-
municative problem involved in using scalar terms. To do this, we need to ab-
stract away from much of the complexity of real-world communication. Thus,
themodels we usewill be idealized and simplistic. This itself is not a problem if
the idealizations and simplifications made do not change the basic structure of
the communicative problem we are focusing on. Modeling is a delicate art be-
cause the space of possibilities is so wide. It’s not interesting to find somemodel
that vindicates Gricean reasoning, one needs to show that that the model is, at
least, a simple, plausible representation of the real-world situation.
In this section I will discuss some basic components of the scalar impli-
cature situation that a game-theoretic account should include and give some
indications about how signaling games can capture these.15
8.1 Asymmetric information
The classic Gricean situations include asymmetric information: the speaker
knows something that the hearer does not. Signaling games are a natural way
of modeling this asymmetry, of course, which is why they are often used to
15Here I am much in debt to the extensive literature on game-theoretic pragmatics, in particular
Franke (2009).
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model language in a game-theoretic setting.
8.2 Cooperativeness
Gricean reasoning works by assuming that the speaker and hearerwant to help
each other, and they both know this. The natural way of modeling this in a
game-theoretic setting is to say that the payoffs for both players are aligned.
Games with this property are called games of coordination (Schelling, 1960;
Lewis, 1969).
8.3 Relevance
It is well known that scalar implicatures are only possible when the differences
between the different states of affairs is relevant to the hearer. The most natural
way to model such relevance is to have the payoffs dependent on the hearer
action in such a way that the hearer benefits from knowing the private infor-
mation of the speaker. If we are interested in pure communication then the
hearer “action” is only a sort of nominal aspect of the game intended to cap-
ture the fact that it is useful for the hearer (and hence the speaker) for him to
know what the speaker knows.
8.4 Background beliefs
It is standard in game theory to assume that speaker and hearer have common
knowledge of the structure of the game. This will be a useful assumption for
us to incorporate as well: we need to assume that the payoffs are identical for
both players and that they know this (and that they know they know this. . . ).
8.5 Message costs
We assume that there are not high costs for uttering one sentence rather than
another: after all, different sentences require only slightly differentmusclemove-
ments. In game theory, a signaling game with nomessage costs is called a cheap
talk game.16
16The classic paper on cheap talk games is Crawford and Sobel (1982), see also Farrell and Rabin
(1996).
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8.6 Meaning
The most vexed issue about modeling implicatures using signaling games is
how to build in the Gricean account of the literal meaning of sentences. On
the Gricean view, the sentence I ate some of the cake is literally compatible with
eating all of the cake. It is only once the implicature is drawn that it comes to
have the stronger meaning which is incompatible with eating all of the cake.
In order to explain this inference, we need to provide a model in which we can
say that the sentence has this weaker literal meaning. This is a considerable
theoretical challenge, as we will see.
Standardly in the economics literature on signaling games it is assumed
that all messages (in a cheap talk game) are “inherently” meaningless signals
which only get meaning in the context of an equilibrium. This view is largely
inherited from Lewis’s seminal treatment of signaling games in Convention.
What I will call a Lewis signaling game is very similar to the ones we want
to discuss. Lewis also assume costless messages and identity of payoff between
speaker and hearer. However, Lewis focused on the question of how messages
get meanings to start with, not the question of how, given the message meaning,
extra inferences can be inferred. Lewis’s suggestion is that meaning derives
from the use of messages in certain repeated signaling games where the same
equilibrium was repeatedly played. Take for instance a simple Lewis signaling
game like that in figure 9. There are the two separating equilibria where the
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Figure 9: A Lewis game
speaker plays either 1a2b or 1b2a and the hearer responds either aLbR or aRbL,
respectively. These equilibria result in real communication, in Lewis’s picture.
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(Other equilibria such as the babbling equilibria where speakers choose signals
randomly and pooling equilibria where speakers always use the same message
do not result in any communication in the usual sense.) Within each separating
equilibria we can speak of the meaning of a or b, but the notion of the meaning
of the signals is only defined relative to the equilibria that is being played.17
The meaning of a signal in an equilibrium is just defined by what types of
speakers uses that signal (or what actions it induces, if the meaning is viewed
imperatively). This is the notion of meaning most often implicitly or explicitly
assumed in the game theory literature.
That this conception of meaning will not be adequate in a model of scalar
implicatures should be obvious. The entire point of the Gricean reasoning is
that with implicatures there is a divergence between how a sentence is used
and what its literal meaning is. So defining the meaning of a term by how it
is actually used in the game model will preclude the possibility of capturing
scalar implicatures within the model.
The only way we can use Lewis’s equilibrium conception of meaning is by
considering an equilibrium as a sort of starting point and thinking of implica-
tures as rationally motivated deviations from the equilibrium. In a sense, this
is exactly the approach taken in much of the game theory and pragmatics lit-
erature such as Benz (2006); Benz and van Rooij (2007); Franke (2009, 2011),
theories which I will discuss later. I think there is some promise to this ap-
proach, but it is conceptually difficult. If people do not play some according
to some equilibrium in the end, and if it can be derived by some sort of rea-
soning that they will not, then it is irrational to take as one’s starting point in
rational deliberation the proposition that they will play this way. Franke (2009,
2011) embraces the irrationality and claims his model is a model of bounded ra-
tionality. This is an interesting tact, but it is a bit strange to think that we can
only model literal meaning in a model of bounded rationality as it would be
desirable to model meaning in a way that does not constitutively depend on
bounded rationality assumptions.18
One obvious way of modeling meaning is by the constraint that speakers
can only use messages when they are literally true (Parikh, 1991, 2001). To
17Lewis was essentially trying to give a game-theoretic reconstruction of Carnap’s notion of
truth-in-model.
18Of course, Franke’s motivation is partly to capture non-cooperative uses of language, which
cannot be captured in the way outlined below.
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effect this we can use non-standard signaling games where speakers are re-
stricted to use only those messages that are literally true given their type. For
examples supposing in the Lewis game in figure 9 that the signal a literally
means the speaker is in state 1, whereas the signal b literally means the speaker
is in state 1 or in state 2. If it is common knowledge that speakers only use
messages that are literally true then we can model this situation with the game
in figure 10. The critical point is that the meaning assumptions are not strong
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Figure 10: Lewis game with built-in meanings
enough to fully determine speaker actions. Thus, how the speaker acts within
the confines of these assumptions may allow the hearer to make strategic in-
ferences.
Restricting speakers to send only truemessages is certainly themost natural
and most common way of treating Gricean literal meaning in a game-theoretic
setting. However, there are some problems with using this technique. One is
that it seems to exclude from the start the idea that speech may be either non-
literal (i.e. metaphorical in some way) or intentionally deceitful. This does not
seem like a serious criticism. The game is a model of how a speaker and hearer
conceptualize their situation. This does not mean that every assumption in
the model needs to be considered an unrevisable assumption of the speaker or
hearer. The speaker or hearer do not need to always conceptualize speech-act
situations as constraining speech to literal meaning, but for the purposes of
scalar implicatures (where speakers are assumed to speak truly, in the standard
Gricean model) this seems like a natural assumption. Criticizing this model
for not allowing for non-literal or strategically deceitful utterances is simply
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criticizing the model for not doing something it is not intended to do.
Franke (2009, pp. 35–37) motivates his choice not to stipulate truthful ut-
terances in an account of scalar implicatures by two further arguments. First,
he argues, for reasons we will see below, that there is no unique equilibrium
requiring Gricean play in these models. So these models simply are not struc-
tured correctly to account for scalar implicature. Most of this paper is con-
cerned with trying to demonstrate that we can make a good argument for
Gricean behavior in this model. Besides the methodological problem this ar-
gument has of assuming that we should be able to derive Gricean play in our
model, I also think this point is substantively wrong. The main argument of
this paper is that such models do allow derivation of Gricean play by using
weak-dominance reasoning, rather than standard equilibrium refinements.
Second, Franke (2009) suggests that there is a conceptual problem with this
model of literal meaning. He writes as follows:
I can very well say whatever I like, whenever I like to whomever I
like. I may have to face social or even legal consequences from time
to time, but it is not as if the semantics of my language restricts the
muscles of my jaw and vocal track, regulating what I possibly can
and what I cannot utter.
I think this argument is not compelling: Game models surely do not need to
providemoves corresponding to all physically possible actions. We use models
to capture players assumptions about how certain situations are structured—
what reasonable possibilities players consider. Even if the assumptions turn
out to be false in some instances it does not mean that speakers and hearers do
not make them.
This is not to say I think that forcing speakers to say only true messages is
the only way to model natural language meanings in a game-theoretic setting.
The literature on credibility in game theory provides some interesting other pos-
sibilities (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Farrell, 1993; Rabin, 1990; Stalnaker, 2005).
I hope to address these other approaches and their relations to scalar implica-
tures on another occasion.
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8.7 Rationality
Besides the model itself, a game-theoretic grounding for scalar implicatures
will include an argument that rational players in the situation modeled should
play in the Gricean way. The plausibility of such an argument depends on
the use of appropriate tools. The game theory literature contains a plethora of
equilibrium refinements and more ad hoc refinements can be invented. Merely
showing that there is some refinement which justifies Gricean behavior does not
show much about the rationality of Gricean reasoning. We do not necessarily
need to use standard game-theoretic tools to explain the rationality of Gricean
implicatures, but whatever tools we use, we need to convincingly argue for
their appropriateness.
8.8 Robustness
Whatever model of the game and of player rationality we use its plausibility
and explanatory value depends on it lacking arbitrary restrictions. A robust
model should not depend, in order to get results, on relatively arbitrary as-
sumptions. For instance, a signaling game model that depended on a very
specific payoff structure to yield the Gricean result would not provide a ro-
bust account of scalar implicatures. Similarly, very strong constraints on the
reasoning patterns of players will not give a plausible grounding of Gricean
reasoning.
Many of the game-theoretic derivations of implicatures that one can find
in the current literature are not robust against small changes. For instance,
as I will argue, some versions of the Iterated Best Response model and the
Optimal Answer model need strong assumptions about players beliefs about
the probability of various states in the game.
8.9 Relation to non-linguistic reasoning
Game theory was developed to deal with strategic interaction generally rather
than language use. Indeed, systematic treatment of linguistic communication
in mainstream game theory is a relative recent phenomenon. One hope in us-
ing game theory to model pragmatic inferences is to relate the underling rea-
soning driving these inferences to reasoning in non-linguistic cases. (This idea
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of relating pragmatics to non-linguistic behavior was also one of Grice’s major
goals.)
The explanatory value of a model of scalar implicatures, thus, depends to
some degree on whether it is sufficiently general to also capture non-linguistic
behavior with similar structures to that of pragmatic inferences. If we can do
this, we can provide an argument that pragmatic inferences are grounded in
general practical rationality rather than some specific linguistic mechanism.
I will argue, in section 17 that the particular reasoning I use here extends to
parallel cases from the economics literature.
9 Simple Gricean game
In this section I present and discuss a very simple model of the Some/All Case
in a game-theoretic framework that is meant to capture its essential features in
accord with the principles about modeling given above.19 I then show—as is
well known in the literature—that the standard equilibrium concept for signal-
ing games, perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), fails to single out the Gricean
strategy in this game.
In this basic model, nature determines whether we are in a some situation
or an all situation with a certain probability distribution. Intuitively we think
of the some situation as the one where the speaker ate just some of the cake and
knows it and the all situation as the one where he ate all of the cake and knows
it. If the speaker is in the some situation (he is of type Ss) then he can and must
send the messagems. If he is in the all situation (Sa) then he can send either the
message ms or ma. It follows that if S sends message ma then H will knows
the speaker-type directly by knowledge of the game structure, but if S sends
message ms then H does not know the speaker type directly, but rather must
infer it. If the hearer makes this inference then this corresponds to deriving the
scalar implicature. Figure 11 represents this partial specification of the game.
We have not yet specified whatH does once S has sent a message, nor what
the payoffs are. How we do this will affect our assessment of the rationality of
different strategies. One natural way of modeling the fact that the S’s type
matters to H is to suppose that the H makes some sort of choice after hearing
19This basic model is very similar to Parikh’s original model, though he chooses not to use the
standard signaling game to describe the situation (Parikh, 1991).
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Figure 11: Simple Gricean game
S’s message, and thatH wants tomake the choice one way if S is of type Ss and
a different way if S is of type Sa. We assume a cooperative situation in which
the speaker and hearer’s interests are aligned so that the payoffs are identical.
I represent this situation with the complete extensive game in figure 12.
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Figure 12: Simple Gricean game with hearer response
I will call strategies Gricean when they intuitively accord with Grice’s max-
ims andGrice’s posited implicatures. The Gricean strategy profile for this game
is clear: for S it is to send mS when in state Ss and ma when in state Sa, for
H it is the best response to this, i.e., to play L in response to ms and to play
R in response to ma. This combination of strategies will ensure payoffs of 1
in each play, the best that can be hoped for, as indicated by the normal-form
description of the game in figure 13. Since both players are guaranteed their
highest possible payoffs if they play this pair of strategies, the pair is a PBE.
Unfortunately, the Gricean strategy pair is not the only PBE. Suppose p ≤ .5.
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msLmaR msLmaL msRmaL msRmaR
SsmsSama 1 p 0 1− p
SsmsSams p p 1− p 1− p
Figure 13: Normal form of Gricean game
Consider the pooling strategy for both players: S sendsms no matter what and
H responds R no matter. It is easy to see that this pair of strategies is also
a PBE: neither type of S has any incentive to change his behavior (type Sa
gets his maximum payoff, whereas Ss has no other options) and H , getting
no usable information from the S, is strictly maximizing his expected payoff
by playing R. For similar reasons, the pooling equilibrium also satisfies many
standard equilibrium refinements such as the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and
Kreps (1987).20
I think it can be safely said that at an intuitive level the Gricean strategy
seems compelling. It seems like even without prior discussion either player can
safely assume the other player will play according to it. The question is howwe
cash out the intuitive rationality of the strategy by means of plausible game-
theoretic tools. All we have seen so far is that the standard equilibrium con-
cepts cannot do this.21
10 Dominance arguments
We saw above how the Simple GriceanModel captures the basic conversational
situation in which the speaker chooses between ‘some’ and ‘all’. However, the
standard equilibrium notions do not single out the Gricean strategy. Here I’ll
show that iterative weak-dominance reasoning does single it out.
If we look at the normal-form representation in figure 13 we can immedi-
ately read off the weak dominance relations. Note first that any hearer strategy
which includes the response of L to ma is weakly dominated. If we elim-
inate these two hearer strategies we get the normal form representation in
20Depending on the probabilities their can also be babbling PBEs in this game: one’s where
speaker S chooses messages randomly (when he has a choice) andH ignores the message.
21This conclusion might seem in tensionwith van Rooij’s claims that Gricean behavior in various
games arises because it is the only Nash equilibrium (van Rooij, 2009; de Jager and van Rooij, 2007).
Van Rooij’s work uses substantive assumption about the structure of the games beyond the ones
here. For this reason I do not find his results robust enough to support the conclusion that scalar
implicatures are generally derived because Gricean behavior is the unique Nash equilibrium.
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figure 14. Here each player has two choices of strategies: the Gricean strat-
egy and the pooling strategy. In this reduced game the speaker’s pooling
msLmaR msRmaR
SsmsSama 1 1− p
SsmsSams p 1− p
Figure 14: Normal form after first removal of dominated strategies
strategy (SsmsSams) is weakly dominated by the speaker’s Gricean strategy
(SsmsSama). So we can eliminate that pooling strategy to get the game in fig-
ure 15. A final application of strict dominance eliminates the hearer’s pooling
msLmaR msRmaR
SsmsSama 1 1− p
Figure 15: Normal form after second removal of dominated strategies
strategy, and we are left with the Gricean speaker strategy.22
It is not very intuitive to think of Gricean games by way of their normal
form: we normally think of players choosing moves as they go rather than opt-
ing for total strategies. For this reason it will be helpful to redo the reasoning
using the extensive-form representation. We can think of each of our appli-
cations of weak dominance as an elimination of one possible move from the
extensive form. We start with the representation in figure 11. Since the move L
in response to message ma will always result in a lower payoff it can be safely
assumed that H will not make that move. This gives us the reduced game tree
in figure 16. In this tree, the speaker in state Sa will guarantee himself the high-
est payoff by sending ma, so this move is weakly dominant. If we adjust the
tree to reflect this we now get the game in figure 17. In this tree a rationalH can
only play L in response to ms, so we can conclude that the full Gricean strate-
gic behavior is what we should expect. Intuitively, these successive removal
of weakly dominated moves are justified on the assumption that it is common
knowledge that both players will not play weakly dominated moves.23
22Note that the dominance argument does not depend on choosing the normal-form represen-
tation of signaling games in which nature is factored in by expectations rather than treating it as a
separate player. The same reasoning works if we treat the Simple Gricean game as a three person
game with nature being the third player, however in this version the last step is another instance
of weak dominance not strict dominance.
23As I noted earlier, actually modeling this kind of common knowledge of rationality in a explicit
way is difficult. Brandenburger et al. (2008) discuss how to overcome these conceptual problems.
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Figure 17: Simple Gricean game after second removal of dominated strategies
To summarize: for the Simple Gricean game, iterative elimination of weakly
dominated straggles leaves only the Gricean strategy pair. So, in this model it
seems that we do not need to stipulate Gricean maxim over and above player
rationality. In the next two sections, I discuss and criticize alternative ways
of capturing scalar implicatures from the recent game theory and pragmatics
literature.
11 Pareto-Nash equilibrium and payoff dominance
In his well-known work on game theory and pragmatics Parikh (1991, 2001) ar-
gues thatwe should captureGricean reasoning using the Pareto-Nash-Equilibrium
solution concept. That is we should assume that rational agents (in these sorts
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of games) will only play strategies that are on Nash equilibria which provide
at least as high payoffs as any other Nash equilibria.24 In the Simple Gricean
game there are only two perfect Bayesian equilibria the Gricean one and the
Pooling one. The Gricean one gives higher expected payoffs then the pooling
one so it is the only Pareto-Nash Equilibrium.
The critical question here is whether choosing Pareto-Nash Equilibria are
really a legitimate constraint on equilibrium choice. Parikh notes that without
such constraints we cannot explain obviously compelling behavior in simple
games with coordinative pay-off structure. For example consider the coordi-
nation game in figure 18. It is arguable that two rational agents playing this
C D
A 1000, 1000 0, 0
B 0, 0 1, 1
Figure 18: Lopsided coordination game
game would choose the A and C equilibrium.25 Standard equilibrium refine-
ments or conceptions of rationality cannot capture this.
It is not clear, however, that small payoff-dominance has such a stark effect.
For instance, if the difference is just a small one, it is not clear that we should ar-
gue that rationality compels players to choose that one: the goal of each player
is just to play what the other plays. In most cases, payoff dominance makes
one solution salient in the sense of Schelling (1960) and Lewis (1969), and since
it also pays more it is natural way to play (and to assume that the other play
will too). The Gricean strategy is also salient in being the unique Pareto-Nash
equilibrium in the Simple Gricean game (in addition to whatever other salience
it may have) its salience may well supports its choice as an equilibrium. But
the conclusion that the Gricean strategy is played because it is salient, would
not seem to be a very satisfying account of its basis in rationality, and in game
theory it is rarely assumed that rational players only play strategies that are
part of payoff dominant equilibria.
24In other words, in the terminology of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) rational players never choose
payoff-dominated equilibria.
25Of course, I am assuming that the ratios between payoffs rather than just the strict ordering
matter, not a standard assumption. Regardless I am just making the intuitive point that where
there are great differences in payoffs the Pareto-Nash equilibrium seems quite compelling.
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12 Reasoning-based accounts
For comparative purposes, in this section, I will discuss the treatment of the
simple Gricean game by the reasoning-based strategies. These strategies, which
include the Iterated Best Response models of Ja¨ger (2007) and Franke (2009)
and the Optimal Answer model of Benz (Benz, 2006; Benz and van Rooij, 2007),
take as inspiration the idea that a certain form of reasoningmay lead to Gricean
behavior. They differ from the treatment above in that less needs to be built into
the game structure itself and more into the assumptions about how the players
will play the game.
12.1 Iterated Best Response models
The idea behind Iterated Best Response models is that strategic reasoning in-
volves a hierarchy of increasingly sophisticated thinking terminating at the
point where further strategic sophistication is otiose, i.e. a fixed point, if such
a point can be reached. In the game model itself we make no constraints based
on the literal meaning, as in figure 19. This game is, thus, a simple coordination
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Figure 19: Model with no built-in meaning
game. Literal meanings instead of being part of the game structure, go rather
into the reasoning of the players.26
I will analyze a variation of Franke’s model.27 Here is a simplified version
26This feature is for the cases we consider here inessential: We could use a more articulated game
structure, forcing truthfulness, and start the chain of reasoning within that structure.
27The reader should consult FrankeDiss, FrankeQuantity for more details. Franke’s model and
Ja¨ger’s model are quite similar, though Ja¨ger intended his model as an evolutionary one, whereas
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Type Strategy
S0 some→ s all : .5→ a.5→ s
H1 s→ R a→ L
S2 some→ s all→ a
H3 s→ R a→ L
. . .
Figure 20: Hierarchy of speaker and hearer types, p = .5
of the model: The most basic first assumption is that there is a sort of default or
focal behavior for S that consist in simply sending random signals that accord
with the literal meaning. Call an S who behaves this way an S0. Let H1 be anH
who plays the best strategy he can on the assumption that he is playing against an
S0. Let an S2 be an S who plays the best strategy he can assuming he is playing
against anH1. And so on.
28 This gives us a hierarchy of types of plays for both
S andH .
These definition are not quite as precise as Franke’s but they are a good
starting point. Let us see what they do for us in the game in figure 19. The
behaviors for the hierarchy of types, when p = .5 is in figure 20. For any n > 1,
if n is odd then Hn = H1 and n is even then SN = S2. So, the series reaches
a fixed point immediately. According to the IBR theory (in this simple form)
players will play those fixed points. This is perfectly Gricean play, so the model
predicts the basic scalar implicatures.
As Franke (2009, 2011) makes clear this is a theory of bounded rationality.
We are considering a hierarchy of increasingly sophisticated players playing
against each other. However, none of the reasoning used in determining the
hierarchy itself is consistent with genuine rationality in the usual sense. It is
not rational—in the usual sense—to suppose that the person you are playing
against is less sophisticated than you.29 Of course, ultimately IBR is just a for-
mal specification of games and solutions, and does not need to conform to any
Franke’s is meant to be a model of bounded rationality. An evolutionary model does not give a
rational grounding for Gricean implicatures in the usual sense, and thus is outside the purview of
my discussion here.
28I am keeping things quicker by not discussing the parallel sequence starting with H0 as an H
who has a literal interpretation of the message from S.
29This is not to say that it is not rational to play the strategies that are the result of such reasoning:
it is just that the reasoning itself is not easily characterized as what we should expect from two
players with common knowledge of rationality.
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Type Strategy
S0 some→ s all : .5→ a.5→ s
H1 s→ R a→ R
S2 any any
. . .
Figure 21: Hierarchy of speaker and hearer types, p = .1
intuitive notion of rationality, bounded or not, it is just inspired by them.
The predictions of this model differ depending on the underlying probabili-
ties in the game structure. Consider, for instance, the game in figure 19 inwhich
p = .1. The Iterated Best Response sequence is given in figure 21. The problem
is that when H1 is responding to S0, thems message does not sufficiently alter
his beliefs to make H1 want to act any differently from how he would in the
absence of any information. This means that there is no unique best response
for S2 to H1, since H1 ignores the message given. Thus, the basic characteri-
zation of the model I gave above does not extend to cover this case since there
is no unique best response. We can, though, easily extend the model to han-
dle cases in which there is not a unique best response. For instance we can
assume that the player chooses randomly among eligible responses (as Franke
does) or we can allow sets of responses into the model (as Jager does).30 Either
way, in the case considered here, we will not get a sequence that converges to
Gricean strategy. Thus, the simple IBR model fails to deal with a large class of
Some/All Cases.
I should note that Franke (2009, §2.2.4, 3.1) admits to some of the shortcom-
ings of the IBR approach for some initial probabilities. Franke argues that the
probabilities in his models should not be thought of as real-world probabilities
but rather as “condensed and simplified representations of generally accessi-
ble meaning associations.” In other words, we should think of some aspects of
the representation of the scalar implicature situation not as relating to a real-
world situation but rather as something that comes as part of the meaning of
the words ‘some’ and ‘all’. Moves like this, however, make the model seem
like less of a rational reconstruction and more of a substantive psychological
30Franke’s choice here is essential in order to capture free-choice inferences.
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account of meaning.31
12.2 Optimal Answer model
A related model is the Optimal Answermodel of Benz (2006) and Benz and van
Rooij (2007). This model is, in essence, a version of the IBR model, though it is
framed rather differently. Essentially S’s action is predicated on the assump-
tion that H simply update his beliefs by means of the literal meaning of the
message. Then, H ’s actual response is based on the belief that S will act in
the way just stated (and a faith in S’s expertise). Without going into detail it
is worth noting that a model with this structure makes very strong bounded
rationality assumptions. For the model to work S needs to solve a decision
problem based on the idea that H will act in a naı¨ve way in which he does not
actually act (i.e. S thinks that H will just update his beliefs according to the
literal message).
There are predictive problems which are similar in character to those fac-
ing the IBR model. In essence, predictive success requires H to have the right
background beliefs about the probability of the different states. As in the IBR
model, if the H thinks that the some state is very unlikely and that S is merely
speaking literally then H ’s action will not be affected by S’s message. So, in
this case, S, with his assumption of a naı¨ve H , will not have any incentive to
use the Gricean strategy.
I should note that these worries (for both IBR and Optimal Answer models)
can be assuaged by structuring the payoffs in a different way. Indeed, many of
the derivations in the literature within Optimal Answer model depend on pay-
offs being determined by degrees of H ’s belief in the true state of the S, rather
than a discrete choice onH ’s part. This treatment of payoffs may eliminate the
models failings in the face of skewed probabilities, but we must then take it on
as yet another substantive assumption. Iterative weak dominance reasoning
will work with eitherway of modeling payoffs.
31Franke also suggests an entirely different way of dealing with the problem: by assuming that
speakers and hearers always assign low probabilities to any available strategies. This will work
in some cases, but it is not clear how to get this to cover scales with more than two points in an
empirically satisfactory way.
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12.3 Critique of reasoning-based models
Reasoning-based accounts, both the IBR and the Optimal Answer models, do
not provide a credible reconstruction of scalar implicatures as a species of ra-
tional inference (indeed it is not clear that they are intended to). Let me sum-
marize the two (related) points that lead me to this conclusion:
Non-Standard Framework Both these accounts use non-standard frameworks:
they propose particular, intricate chains of reasoning to account for scalar
implicatures. It is important to note that these models are not given as a
heuristic to get a result also achievable by assumptions of real rationality.
In that sense the title of bounded rationality is misleading. In fact, on these
models literal meanings are defined in terms of theses chains of reasoning,
so it is not even in principle possible to reconstruct a non-bounded, truly
rational model. Of course, the models are ultimately just formal charac-
terizations of solution concepts, and they need not cohere with any par-
ticular conception of human rationality (bounded or not) even if they are
inspired by them.
Once we accept this, though we face a more general problem in evaluat-
ing these models. Clearly what should support them is empirical data.
The problem here is that the empirical bar for theories constructed to han-
dle a set of data is very high. Given the large space of parameters that can
be tinkered with in creating a new equilibrium concept, we should expect
wide empirical coverage. But models such as IBR are specifically con-
structed to work with a limited set of linguistic situations, so are resistant
to the sort of wide-empirical support they would need.
Parameter Setting I noted that, unlike weak dominance reasoning, both the
IBR model and the Optimal Answer model only works over a limited
range of assumptions about the prior probabilities. Both also rely on a
particular specification of what naive behavior is to get the reasoning go-
ing (i.e. the starting point of the level-k reasoning embodied in the hier-
archy of speaker and hearer types). Not only do we need to assume a
of specific pattern of reasoning, but we also need to assume a particular
initial set-up not common to all (real-world) cases of scalar implicature
derivation. This is not to say this assumption is unpalatable: after all,
perhaps we do as a matter of fact assume a kind of even distribution of
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probabilities of underlying states when calculating scalar implicatures.
Even if the assumption has some plausibility it is a substantive assump-
tion about how these situations are structured. The more such assump-
tions one makes, the less robust the model is.
For these reasons it seems to me that we must view the reasoning-based
models not as credible explanations of why implicatures are rational infer-
ences but rather as strong empirical hypotheses (statedwithin a game-theoretic
framework) about how implicatures are calculated. To make this a credible hy-
pothesis these models need to provide more empirical coverage than standard
Gricean theories can.32 This is an interesting line of research but I think it is im-
portant to distinguish what we get from them from the project here of trying
to capture scalar-implicature derivation as rational inference.
13 Non-expertise
Effectively the Simple Gricean game assumes speaker expertise. The two types
of speakers both have all of the relevant information about the state of the
world: the speaker either knows that some of the cake was eaten or that all of
the cake was eaten. However, we can imagine that speakers might only have
partial information.
Let us model the two complete situations as worlds: wa is the world where
all was eaten, ws¬a is the world where just some was eaten. Now consider the
simple Some/All game where the speaker can have any level of knowledge
compatible with truthfully saying ‘some’ or ‘all’. Figure 22 lists the three types
of speakers in this situation, classified according to their states of knowledge.
Ignoring payoffs, but assuming that the speaker can only utter sentences he
believes to be true, we can draw this as an extensive-form game in figure 23.
Assuming that the payoffs are aligned and H benefits from having confidence
in the true state of theworld, any strategy for Sa that does not have him playing
ma with probability one will be weakly dominated by the variant in which Sa
32Franke (2009), in particular, tries to cover a range of cases beyond simple scalar implicatures
including manner implicatures and free-choice implicatures with his model. Weak-dominance
reasoning will not derive free-choice implicatures, but this might not be a bad result as there is
considerable empirical evidence that they do not pattern with normal scalar implicatures (Chemla,
2009).
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Type Knowledge
Sa {wa}
Ss {ws¬a}
Sas {wa, ws¬a}
Figure 22: Speaker types
r
p
q
N
ms
ma
Sa
ms
Ss
ms
Sas
Figure 23: Simple Gricean game with non-expert
sendsma with probability 1. IfH knows that S will not play weakly dominated
strategies, thenH can infer that if he receives signalms then S is not of type ta.
Thus, weak-dominance reasoning tells us that the hearer can infer that if
the message ‘some’ is received then the speaker does not know the world is
wa (though he might not have ruled it out either). This is the standard ‘epis-
temic’ inference assumed in the literature on pragmatics.33 So, merely adding
uncertainty to the simple model does not cause any problem for the kind of
reasoning we were using before.
14 Three-point scales
So far, for simplicity’s sake, we have concentrated on a two-point scale, ‘some’/‘all’.
However, classic Gricean reasoning based on the maxim of Quantity extends
33The point that epistemic inferences are the only one’s licensed without knowledge assump-
tion was first emphasized in a formal framework in Soames’ (1982) critique of Gazdar’s (1979)
treatment of implicatures.
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to scales of arbitrary size. Consider, for instance, a three-point scale, such as
{‘some’, ‘most’, ‘all’}, where ‘all’ entails ‘most’ which entails, in turn, ‘some’—
e.g. ‘I ate all the cake’→ ‘I ate most of the cake’→ ‘I ate some of the cake’. If
a speaker chooses between these three expression guided by the the Maxim of
Quantity then he will only say ‘some’ when he does not know ‘most’ or ‘all’,
and he will only say ‘most’ when does not know ‘all’. Thus, the hearer can infer
from an utterance of ‘most’ that the speaker does not know ‘all’, and from an
utterance of ‘some’ that the speaker does not know ‘most’ or ‘all’. (Assuming,
as always, that these differences are known to be relevant.)
Let us consider the case in which we are dealing with an expert speaker,
and thus limit ourselves to three speaker types. The extensive-form represen-
tation (without H ’s responses) is given in figure 24. The full set of possible
pure strategies for S is in figure 25. In this game the hearer has three possible
responses A, B, C and the payoffs (which are dependent just on S’s type and
H ’s response) are coordinative: both players are best off if the hearer can deter-
mine the speaker’s type and act appropriately. Figure 26 gives all the possible
pure hearer strategies in this game (with the first round of weakly-dominated
strategies removed).
In this game there will always be more than one PBE. While the Gricean
strategies will always be a PBE, either the pair (PP2,NG3) or (PP2, NG4) will
also be a PBE (which one depends on the initial probabilities of the different
speaker types).
Despite there being at least two possible PBEs, iterative weak-dominance
reasoning will again pick out the Gricean strategy pair. First, consider the
speaker of type Sa. For him the use of any message but ma is weakly dom-
inated: ma will always get him the highest payoff no matter what strategy the
hearer chooses, whereas using and mm and ms will not always do so. If the
hearer knows that the speaker will always use ma when he is of type Sa, then
he can infer that if he receives another message the speaker cannot be of type
Sa. If the speaker knows this, in turn, then for the speaker of type Sm send-
ing message mm weakly dominates sending message ms, its only alternative.
Thus, the hearer will send that message, which means he will play the Gricean
strategy in all instances. If the hearer, in turn, knows this then the only strategy
left is the pure Gricean interpretation strategy. So iterative weak dominance
reasoning forces Gricean behavior. It should be clear, too, that the reasoning
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0
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0
A
1
B
0
H
H
Figure 24: Three-point scale
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Type Sa Sm Ss
Grice ma mm ms
PP1 mm mm ms
PP2 mm ms ms
PP3 ms mm ms
Pooling ms ms ms
Figure 25: Speaker pure strategies
ma mm ms
Grice A B C
NG1 A B B
NG2 A B A
NG3 A A C
NG4 A A B
NG5 A A A
Figure 26: Hearer pure strategies
here generalizes to n-point scales for any finite n.34
15 Expanding alternative utterances
Apersistent criticism of the Gricean account of scalar implicatures is it depends
on a very narrow limitation on the number of messages a speaker is able to
send. A version of this problem, recently dubbed “the symmetry problem”, can
be explained as follows: Supposewe have an expert speaker in in the Some/All
problem.35 Recall the informal reasoning that gets us from the fact that the
speaker says ‘some’ to the implicature that he knows that the state of the world
is the some state and not the all state: If the speaker had known that the ‘all’
sentence was true he would have said it. He did not, so he must not know it to
be true. Therefore, he knows that the speaker knows ‘some’ is true (since he is
an expert).
Unfortunately, we can give a symmetric line of reasoning if the speaker
has utterance ‘some but not all’ available to him. If the speaker had known
that ‘some but not all’ was true he should have said it (by Quantity). Since he
34Generalizing beyond a two-point scale is not to be taken for granted, there are various strate-
gies that might work for a two-point scale that fail to generalize, such as “naive unravelling” an
approach proposed by Franke et al. (2012).
35The problem has been known for a long time, but was formalized by Irene Heim and Kai von
Fintel in lecture notes (see e.g. Fox, 2006).
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didn’t say it he doesn’t know it. Therefore he must know that ‘all’ is true (since
he is an expert).
In truth, then, an expert speaker who has available to him the utterances
‘some’, ‘some but not all’, and ‘all’ who is governed just by the maxim of Quan-
tity (and truthfulness constraints) should always say either ‘some but not all’
or ‘all’: he should not ever say ‘some’ alone. This is a bad prediction: in real
life, expert speakers often use ‘some’ alone.
A parallel problem faces a game-theoretic treatment once we allow speak-
ers to use a ‘some but not all’ message in the Simple Gricean game. This is
represented in figure 27. As the symmetry of the game there makes clear, there
is no way to argue on rational grounds in this model that ms should be inter-
preted in any particularway. Thuswe again seem to require that well-informed
speakers should never say ‘some’ as opposed to ‘some but not all’.
1− pp N
msbna
ms
Ss
ma
ms
Sa
Figure 27: Gricean game with some-but-not-all
I will discuss two ways of dealing with this problem. One way is to restrict
the alternatives available in a given speech-act situation. The other way is to
add message costs.
15.1 Restrictions on alternatives
It is common to simply posit that there are a restricted set of messages that
we consider when we evaluate scalar implicatures, and that these messages do
not include ‘some but not all’. If we do this we can simply keep our previous
models in which ‘some but not all’ was not a recognized speaker option. This
may not be as ad hoc as it seems. We might think that there are constraints
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in the grammar on which lexical items compete against each other, and that
these constraints facilitate Gricean inferences. Since Horn (1972) there has been
some effort in linguistics to give principled conditions for two lexical items to
compete against each other (Matsumoto, 1995; Fox and Katzir, 2009).
15.2 Message costs
A trick common in the game theory and pragmatics literature for dealing with
this problem is to suppose that the ‘some but not all’ has a small cost.36 This
cost should not be of the same magnitude as the cost of failing to convey infor-
mation: cooperative speakers do not sacrifice relevant communicative content
by saying something shorter (rather monosyllabic teenagers do this to display
uncooperativeness). There are different ways of modeling such small costs in
game theory, but for here simply using small numbers will be sufficient.
Take the case of an expert speaker who has available to him three messages
ma,ms, andmsbna. We will assume that msbna incurs a small cost. Here, there
are only two types of speakers but three messages: the basic game structure
is in figure 28. Assuming the S will not use weakly dominate strategies we
1− pp N
msbna
ms
Ss
ma
ms
Sa
R
0, 0
L
.9, .9
R
0, 0
L
1, 1
R
1, 1
L
0, 0
R
1, 1
L
0, 0
Figure 28: Some but not all with costs
can prune the game to get the new game in figure 29. Now, of course, msbna
becomes a dominated move for the S. Thus, assuming speaker expertise and
marginal cost to saying the longer form, we get the desired result that ms is
used to indicate the speaker knows some.
36Parikh (1991, 2001) first suggested this strategy. For examples in the IBR tradition see Franke
(2009, 2011) and Ja¨ger and Ebert (2008).
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1− pp N
msbna
ms
Ss
ma
Sa
L
.9, .9
L
1, 1
R
1, 1
Figure 29: Some but not all with costs
Note that this reasoning has limited generality. As the reader can verify, we
still are forced to make the prediction that a speaker who is not assumed to be
an expert will never say ‘some’ to mean ‘some but not all’. To overcome this
limitation we need to make more substantive (and less plausible) assumptions.
16 Relevance implicatures
So far, I have only considered cases of scalar implicatures. However, in this
section I will suggest that another kind of implicature, a relevance implicature,
might be captured using weak-dominance reasoning.
A famous example from Grice goes as follows. The hearer stops in the car
and asks the speaker if there’s anywhere to get petrol. The speaker responds
that there’s petrol station down the road. This response takes this to implicate
that the station is open and operating.
We can give a model of this situation in which the expert speaker has two
possible states of knowledge, 1) that he knows where the petrol station is and
knows it is open (call a speaker who knows this a So) , 2) that he knows where
one is but knows it is closed (call a speaker who knows this a Sc). This is a
rather crude simplification but a game-theoretic model of this situation will
need to make some sort of assumption like this. We can also think of two
signaling options available to him: 1) giving information about the location
of the petrol station (g), 2) not giving information (¬g). If the hearer is told
where the petrol station is he has the choice of either going to the station (action
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G), or continuing his journey without going there (action C). If he does not
receive that information he must continue his journey. The payoffs are ordered
as follows: the payoffs are highest if the gas station is open and the hearer
goes there. The medium payoff is that the hearer just continues his search
(regardless of whether the gas station is there or not). And the lowest payoff is
if the gas station is closed and the hearer goes there. Figure 30 is the extensive-
form representation of this game.
1− pp N
¬g
1, 1
g
So
¬g
1, 1
g
Sc
H
C
1, 1
G
2, 2
C
1, 1
G
0, 0
Figure 30: Petrol station game
It is immediately clear from this model that for a speaker (Sc) who knows
the petrol station is closed not providing any information is a weakly dominant
move. For doing so ensures that the speaker continues his journey which is
the highest payoff possible. If this is common knowledge, then then it is also
common knowledge that if the the speaker gives the location of the gas station
then he is of type So. In this case, when hearer receives the location, he will
know that it is open (and thus go to it to maximize his utility).
So in this simple model of Grice’s example, weak dominance reasoning
again yields the correct implicature. This is a very open-ended kind of example
however, so it is hard to say if this is the right way of modeling it. My main
point here is just to demonstrate that the iterative weak dominance reasoning
plausibly extends to cover other examples of implicatures besides scalar impli-
catures. However the open-endedness inherent in how we model such exam-
ples makes it hard to give a convincing argument that this is how we should
think of such implicatures.
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17 A non-linguistic case
In this section, I will consider a situation, analogous to a commonly discussed
one in the economics literature, which has the same structure as some of our
scalar implicature cases.37 I show that the iterative weak-dominance reasoning
provides a plausible explanation of how people act in this case, just as it does
in the scalar implicature cases. This provides further support for the idea that
Gricean reasoning need not be thought of as a special sort of reasoning: rather
the exact same patterns of reasoning can be observed in non-linguistic contexts.
First, I will sketch the standardmodel in the economics literature on disclo-
sure of verifiable information (Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981). In this situa-
tion, a seller has some asset, which he knows the value of, and the seller has the
option to release evidence that proves the asset is at least a certain worth. For
simplicity assume there are n (total) pieces of evidence the seller can release
e0 to en−1. Assume the buyer knows there are n possible states of value the
asset can have v0 < v2. . .< vn−1. In state v0 there is no evidence the seller can
release, in state v0, the seller can release e0, and in state v1 the seller can release
either e0 or e1, and so on. The situation works as follows: first the seller the
releases some chosen piece of evidence, and then the buyer performs an action
(i.e. makes purchase or a bid for a purchase). We assume the payoffs are such
that the buyer can make the optimal decision if only if he knows the value of
the asset. The seller, on the other hand, prefers buyer actions corresponding to
higher beliefs about the value, regardless of the actual value.
Regardless of the buyer’s initial beliefs about the likelihood of the asset
having each of the values (as long as he thinks each value is possible), there is
a direct (informal) argument that the seller will release all the information he
can: i.e. the seller with an asset of value vn−1 will release en−1 and the seller
with an asset of value vn−2 will release en−2 and so on. The argument for this
view goes as follows: the seller of an asset vn−1 guarantees himself his highest
possible return by releasing en−1, so he will do this. Since this is known to
the buyer, then the seller of an asset with value vn−2 will guarantee himself
his highest return by releasing en−2, and so on. This argument is formalized
and applied to certain variations on the situation above by Grossman (1981);
Milgrom (1981), in what is sometimes known as the full-disclosure theorem.
37Dirk Bergemann first suggested this connection to me; Sobel (2010) and Franke et al. (2012)
discusses this connection.
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buy don’t
v0 1,−1 0, 0
v1 1, 1 0, 0
Figure 31: Two state disclosure
However, as Franke et al. (2012) notes, that there are very simple situations
of this form where there are PBEs in which full-disclosure does not occur. In
particular just consider a simple case in which there are two states, v0 and
v1 and two pieces of evidence e0 and e1. The only choice the seller makes is
whether to release e1 or e0 when the asset has value v1 (if the value is v0 he
must release e0). Assume they buyer has two options: to buy or not to buy,
and prefers buying only if the value is v1. We could then have the payoffs as in
Figure 31. As long as the the prior distribution is sufficiently skewed to v1 there
will be a PBE in which the seller always releases e0 and the buyer always buys.
But we can escape this problem, and get full disclosure by iterative elimination
of weakly-dominated strategies.
I take it as a distinct virtue of the iterative dominance approach that it sup-
ports such structural analogies between linguistic problems and non-linguistic
problems. This analogy is one the reasoning-based approaches I discussed
above cannot capture: For those views, as I argued, are sensitive to the initial
probability distribution. But in the disclosure case, the behavior is not contin-
gent on this distribution. Rather we should think that regardless of the initial
probability distribution we expect the “Gricean” behavior on the part of seller
and buyer.
18 Conclusion
The main purpose of my paper has been to show that for a variety of ideal-
ized cases we can give a principled game-theoretic account of the derivation
of scalar implicatures. The assumptions and cost of this model were high,
however. We assumed discrete models taken out of context with mutually
known and understood payoffs—something we rarely see in real speech-act
situations. We also assumed completely cooperativeness which we modeling
by absolute identity of payoffs. We also hard-wired into the model the seman-
tic conventions by refusing to let speakers say sentences they do not believe
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to be true. Even with these assumptions the most standard solution concepts,
such as Nash equilibrium or perfect Bayesian equilibrium, do not serve to pick
out the Gricean behavior. However, we saw that in many cases iterative elimi-
nation of weakly dominated strategies serves to single out the Gricean strategy.
References
Battigalli, Pierpaolo and Bonanno, Giacomo (1999). Recent results on belief,
knowledge and the epsitemic foundations of game theory. Research in Eco-
nomics, 53:149–225.
Benz, Anton (2006). Utility and relevance of answers. In Benz Anton, Gerhard
Ja¨ger, and Robert van Rooij (eds.), Game Theory and Pragmatics. Breheney.
Benz, Anton and van Rooij, Robert (2007). Optimal assertions and what they
implicate. Topoi, 26:63–78.
Bernheim, B. Douglas (1984). Rationalizable strategic behavior. Econometrica,
52:1007–1028.
Brandenburger, Adam (2007). The power of paradox: some recent devel-
opments in interactive epistemology. International Journal of Game Theory,
35:465–492.
Brandenburger, Adam, Friedenberg, Amanda, and Keisler, H. Jerome (2008).
Admissibility in games. Econometrica, 76:307–352.
Chemla, Emmanuel (2009). Universal implicatures and free choice effects: Ex-
perimental data. Semantics and Pragmatics, 2:1–33.
Chierchia, Gennaro (2004). Scalar implicatures, polarity phenomenon, and the
syntax/pragmatic interface. In Andrea Belleti (ed.), Structures and Beyond.
Oxford University Press.
Chierchia, Gennaro, Fox, Danny, and Spector, Benjamin (2012). Scalar implica-
ture as a grammatical phenomenon. In Paul Portner, Claudia Maienborn,
and Klaus von Heusinger (eds.), Handbook of Semantics, volume 3, pages
2297–2332. de Gruyter.
46
Cho, In-Koo andKreps, DavidM. (1987). Signaling games and stable equilbiria.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102:179–221.
Crawford, Vincent and Sobel, Joel (1982). Strategic information transmission.
Econometrica, 50:1431–1451.
Farrell, Joseph (1993). Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games. Games and
Economic Behavior, 5:514–531.
Farrell, Joseph and Rabin, Matthew (1996). Cheap talk. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 10:103–118.
Fox, Danny (2006). Free choice and the theory of scalar implicatures. Unpub-
lished manuscript.
Fox, Danny and Katzir, Roni (2009). On the characterization of alternatives.
Unpublished manuscript, MIT.
Franke, Michael (2009). Signal to Act. Ph.D. thesis, Institute for Logic, Language
and Computation, University of Amsterdam.
— (2011). Quantity implicatures, exhaustive interpretation, and rational con-
versation. Semantics and Pragmatics, 4(1).
Franke, Michael, de Jager, Tikitu, and van Rooij, Robert (2012). Relevance in
cooperation and conflict. Journal of Logic and Computation, 22:23–54.
Gazdar, Gerald (1979). Pragmatics: Implicature, Presupposition and Logical Form.
Academic Press.
Grice, Paul (1967/1989). Logic and conversation. In Studies in theWays of Words.
Harvard University Press.
Grossman, Sanford (1981). The informational role of warranties and private
disclosure about product quality. Journal of Law and Economics, 24:461–483.
Harsanyi, John and Selten, Reinhard (1988). A General Theory of Equilibrium
Selection in Games. MIT Press.
Horn, Laurence (1972). The Semantics of the Logical Operators in English. Ph.D.
thesis, UCLA.
47
Ja¨ger, Gerhard (2007). Game dynamics connects semantics with pragmatics. In
Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (ed.), Game Theory and Linguistic Meaning. Elsevier.
Ja¨ger, Gerhard and Ebert, Christian (2008). Pragmatic rationalizability. In
Arndt Riester and Torgim Solstad (eds.), Proceedings of SuB13.
de Jager, Tikitu and van Rooij, Robert (2007). Explaining quantity implicatures.
In Proceedings of the 11th conference on theoretical aspects of rationality and knowl-
edge.
Kohlberg, Elon and Mertens, Jean-Franc¸ois (1986). On the strategic stability of
equilibria. Econometrica, 54:1003–1037.
Lewis, David (1969). Convention. Harvard University Press.
Marx, Leslie and Swinkles, Jeroen (1997). Order independence for iterated
weak dominance. Games and Economic Behavior, 18:219–245.
Matsumoto, Yo (1995). The conversational condition on horn scales. Linguistics
and Philosophy, 18:21–60.
Milgrom, Paul (1981). Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and
applications. Bell Journal of Economics, 12:380–391.
Noveck, Ira (2001). When children are more logical than adults: experimental
investigations of scalar implicature. Cognition, 78:165–188.
Parikh, Prashant (1991). Communication and strategic inference. Linguistics
and Philosophy, 14(473–531).
— (2001). The Use of Language. CSLI.
Pearce, David (1984). Rational strategic behavior and the problem of perfec-
tion. Econometrica, 52:1029–1050.
Rabin, Matthew (1990). Communication between rational agents. Journal of
Economic Theory, 51:144–170.
Rochet, Jean-Charles (1980). Selection of unique equilibrium payoff for exten-
sive games with perfect information. Mimeo.
48
van Rooij, Robert (2009). Optimal-theoretic and game-theoretic approaches to
implicature. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Spring 2009 edition.
Rosenthal, Robert (1981). Games of perfect information, predatory pricing, and
the chain store. Journal of Economic Theory, 25:92–100.
Sauerland, Uli (2004). Scalar implicatures in complex sentences. Linguistics and
Philosophy, 27:367–391.
Schelling, Thomas C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press.
Schulz, Katrin and van Rooij, Robert (2006). Pragmatic meaning and non-
monotonic reasoning. Linguistics and Philosophy, 29(2):205–250.
Soames, Scott (1982). How presuppositions are inherited: A solution to the
projection problem. Linguistic Inquiry, 13(3):483–545.
Sobel, Joel (2009). Signaling games. In Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems
Science. 8125–8139.
— (2010). Giving and recieving advice. Working Paper UCSD.
Spector, Benjamin (2006). Aspects de la pragmatique des ope´rateurs logiques. Ph.D.
thesis, Universite Paris 7, Denis Diderot.
Spence, Michael (1973). Job market signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 87:355–374.
Sperber, Dan and Wilson, Deirdre (1986). Relevance: Communication and Cogni-
tion. Blackwell.
Stalnaker, Robert (2005). Saying and meaning, cheap talk and credibility. In
Anton Benz, Gerhard Ja¨ger, and Robert van Rooij (eds.), Game Theory and
Pragmatics. Palgrave MacMillan.
49
